資訊洞見

未有及時披露有關收購洽商的內幕消息的首個裁決

[ 本內容只備有英文及簡體中文版 ]

Since the commencement of Part XIVA of the Securities and Futures Ordinance on 1 January 2013, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has brought proceedings against eight listed companies and their officers for late disclosure of inside information. The Market Misconduct Tribunal (MMT) has found six companies and their officers culpable for breach of the disclosure requirements, while the proceedings of the remaining two cases are still continuing.

Among the six decided cases, the latest case decided in March 2020 is the only one that involved inside information concerning “an incomplete proposal or negotiation”, which is one of the specified categories of information which a listed company would otherwise be permitted to withhold or delay disclosure (Safe Harbour) had it satisfied the following conditions:

  • the company has taken reasonable precautions for preserving the confidentiality of the information; and
  • the confidentiality of the information is preserved.

Background of the case

In this case, the inside information was in relation to the proposed acquisition of all the issued shares of the listed company concerned (Company) by a third party offeror (Offeror). 

The three founders of the Company, who were the Company’s executive directors, together held close to 30% interest in the Company (Founders) and the Offeror had discussions relating to the Offeror’s acquisition proposal since early March 2013. In a meeting held on 27 April 2013, the Offeror and the Founders agreed that an offer price of not less than HK$5.5 per share would be put before the Company’s board of directors for their consideration.

The Company did not disclose the information relating to the acquisition proposal to the public until early August 2013, when it announced that it was in the course of negotiating a possible transaction with a third party which could lead to an offer for all the issued shares of the Company. Then, in mid-August 2013, the Company announced that the Offeror had put forward a proposal of acquiring all the issued shares of the Company by way of a scheme of arrangement, under which all the Company’s shares would be cancelled in exchange for HK$6.3 in cash for each share. 

MMT’s ruling

When did the inside information come into existence?

The MMT considered that inside information in relation to the Company and its shares came into existence as a result of the discussions and agreements between the parties on 27 April 2013 as there was a “commercial reality” to the negotiations which had gone beyond “testing the waters”.

When did the inside information come to the knowledge of the Company?

The MMT considered that the inside information which came into existence at the meeting of 27 April 2013 came to the knowledge of the Company when it came to the knowledge of one of the Founders (who was the chairman of the Company) in the course of his performing functions as an officer of the Company because MMT was satisfied that, based on the evidence, from the outset in making arrangements for and then conducting meetings with the institutional investors after the meeting on 27 April 2013, the chairman did so as an officer of the Company. For the other two Founders (whose functions focused on business operations), despite that they also participated in the same meeting, the MMT considered that they were acting in their personal interests as shareholders of the Company.

Was the Company entitled to rely on the Safe Harbour to delay disclosure?

The MMT considered that there was no plausible explanation for the significant rise in the Company’s share price from its close of HK$4.00 on 26 April to its close of HK$4.85 on 8 May 2013, other than that the confidentiality of the inside information had not been preserved.

There was no evidence at all that the significant share price rise had even been identified, discussed and assessed within the Company. The MMT concluded that the Company did not take reasonable precautions for preserving the confidentiality of the inside information nor take reasonable measures to monitor the confidentiality of the inside information. 

Therefore, the Company was not entitled to rely on the Safe Harbour.

Who are culpable of negligent conduct which resulted in the Company’s breach of the disclosure requirement?

The MMT found that the failure of the chairman and the company secretary (who was also an executive director) to carry out their functions resulted in the Company’s late disclosure of inside information as they failed to provide all the relevant information to other directors, and to monitor whether or not there was a leakage of that information, with particular regard to movements in the price and volume of trading in the Company’s shares.

Did the directors take all reasonable measures to ensure proper safeguards existed to prevent the breach of the Company’s disclosure requirement?

The MMT found that all the four executive directors (including the three Founders and the company secretary) and a non-executive director failed to take all reasonable measures to ensure that proper safeguards existed within the Company to prevent it from breaching its disclosure obligation.

Four other non-executive directors were not found to be in contravention of their duties because the MMT noted that:

–       one of them had proposed to carry out an internal control review, which was however not adopted by the board;

–       an independent non-executive director had identified the Company’s internal control systems as being “somewhat deficient and not up to standards” and endorsed the aforesaid proposal to conduct an internal control review; and

–       for the other two independent non-executive directors, neither of them was a businessman, and they were appointed to the board to bring to the Company their skill and knowledge as academic research scientists. They reposed a considerable degree of trust in and reliance on the experience and professionally qualified executive directors, and the MMT was satisfied that they were entitled to do so.

The MMT will hold a hearing on the making of the consequential orders on 25 April 2020.

Reminder of importance to maintain confidentiality during takeover talks: Takeovers Code implications

The case discussed above illustrated the importance of preserving confidentiality of inside information relating to a takeover talk in the context of the listed company’s statutory obligations to disclose inside information as soon as reasonably practicable. The listed company should have taken reasonable precautions for preserving, and reasonable measures to monitor, the confidentiality of the inside information, and it should disclose the information as soon as reasonably practicable after it becomes aware that the confidentiality of the information has not been preserved.

Listed companies and other parties who are in negotiation concerning an offer subject to the Takeovers Code should also bear in mind the requirements under Rule 1.4 of the Takeovers Code to maintain confidentiality and take all necessary steps to ensure there is no leakage of information prior to the announcement of a firm intention to make an offer.

In the June 2016 issue of the Takeovers Bulletin, the SFC stressed the vital importance that parties maintain confidentiality, and that where confidentiality is maintained, there should not be any rumour or speculation about a possible offer or undue movement in the share price triggering a need to issue a “talks” announcement under Rule 3.7 of the Takeovers Code. The SFC reminded that Rule 3.7 announcements should not be issued as a matter of convenience as the publication of these announcements has an impact on the market price of the listed companies concerned.

[ 簡體版 ]

自《证券及期货条例》第XIVA部在2013年1月1日生效至今,证券及期货事务监察委员会(证监会)已对八家上市公司及他们的高级人员展开研讯程序,指该等公司未有及时披露内幕消息。市场失当行为审裁处(审裁处)已裁定六家公司及他们的高级人员违反披露规定,而余下两宗案件的研讯程序仍在进行中。

在六宗已判决的案件当中,最新一宗在2020年3月判决的案件是唯一一宗涉及关乎“一项未完成的计划或商议”的内幕消息的案件。“一项未完成的计划或商议”的内幕消息属于获准延迟披露的某些订明类别的消息的其中一项(安全港条文),倘若有关上市公司符合以下条件,其本可获准延迟有关披露内幕消息:

  • 有关公司已经采取合理预防措施,将该消息保密 ;及
  • 该消息得以保密。

案情摘要

在该案件中,内幕消息关乎一名第三方要约人(要约人)对相关上市公司(该公司)的全部已发行股份的建议收购。

该公司的三名创办人(为该公司的执行董事,并共同持有该公司接近30%的权益)(创办人)与要约人自2013年3月初就要约人的收购建议进行商议。在2013年4月27日举行的会议上,要约人与创办人协定,将会向该公司的董事会提出不低于每股5.5港元的要约价,以供其考虑。

该公司直至2013年8月初才向公众披露有关收购建议的消息;当时,该公司发出公告,指其正在与第三方协商一项可能交易,这或会导致对该公司的全部已发行股份提出要约。随后在2013年8月中旬,该公司发出公告,指要约人建议透过协议计划收购该公司的全部已发行股份,据此该公司的全部股份将会以每股股份换取现金6.3港元的方式予以注销。

审裁处的裁定

内幕消息在何时出现?

审裁处认为,关乎该公司及其股份的内幕消息是基于有关方在2013年4月27日的讨论及协议而出现,因为有关磋商已反映“商业实况”并且已超出“纯属试探的性质”。

该公司在何时知内幕消息?

审裁处认为,创办人之一(为该公司的主席)是在以该公司的高级人员的身分执行职能时,知道在2013年4月27日举行的会议上出现的内幕消息,而该公司即属知道该内幕消息。这是由于审裁处基于证据而信纳,主席在一开始为2013年4月27日的会议后与机构投资者进行的会议作出安排以及其后进行该等会议是以该公司的高级人员的身分如此行事。至于就另外两名创办人(其主要执行业务运营职能)而言,虽然他们也参与同一会议,但审裁处认为他们是以该公司股东的身分而基于自己的个人利益行事。

该公司是否有权倚赖安全港条文而延迟作出披露?

审裁处认为,除了有关内幕消息并未得以保密外,没有任何言之有理的原因可说明为何该公司的股价从2013年4月26日的收市价4.00港元大幅上升至2013年5月8日的收市价4.85港元。

没有证据显示该公司内部曾经就股价的大幅上升作出辨识、讨论或评估。审裁处得出结论是,该公司没有采取合理预防措施将有关内幕消息保密,也没有采取合理措施以监察该内幕消息的保密情况。

因此,该公司不可以倚赖安全港条文。

是谁的疏忽行为导致该公司违反披露规定?

由于该公司的主席以及公司秘书(兼任执行董事)没有向其他董事提供所有有关消息以及监察该等消息是否外泄(特别是关于该公司股份的成交价及成交量的变动),审裁处裁定他们两人没有履行他们的职能,导致该公司未有及时披露有关内幕消息。

董事是否采取了一切合理措施以确保有妥善的預防措施,防止该公司违反披露规定?

审裁处裁定,全部四名执行董事(包括三名创办人及公司秘书)以及一名非执行董事都没有采取一切合理措施以确保该公司内部有妥善的預防措施,防止该公司违反其披露责任。

审裁处注意到以下情况,因此裁定四名其他非执行董事没有违反他们的责任:

–       其中一名曾建议进行内部监控审核,但没有获得董事会接纳;

–       一名独立非执行董事曾表示该公司的内部监控制度“有所不足及未达标准”,并且赞同上述进行内部监控审核的建议;及

–       就其他两名独立非执行董事而言,该两人都不是商人,获委任为董事的目的是将其作为学术科研人员的技能及知识带给该公司。他们都高度信任及依赖于具备专业资历的执行董事,而审裁处信纳他们有权如此信任及依赖于该等执行董事。

审裁处将会在2020年4月25日就作出相应命令举行聆讯。

在收购洽商期间务须将消息保密:《收购守则》的涵义

以上讨论的案件说明,就上市公司在合理地切实可行的范围内尽快披露内幕消息的法定责任而言,将涉及收购洽商的内幕消息保密之重要性。上市公司应当采取合理预防措施将该内幕消息保密,以及采取合理措施以监察该内幕消息的保密情况,而在知悉该消息并未得以保密后,应在合理地切实可行的范围内尽快披露该消息。

在就一项受《收购守则》监管的要约进行商议的上市公司及其他各方,也应谨记《收购守则》规则1.4规定,必须将有关资料保密及采取一切必要的措施,以确保在公布作出要约的确实意图之前不会泄露有关消息。

在2016年6月号的《收购通讯》中,证监会强调各方务须将消息保密,在消息得以保密的情况下,便不应出现关于可能要约的谣言或揣测或者股价的不正常波动以致触发根据《收购守则》规则3.7发出“洽商”公布的需要。证监会提醒,不应为方便起见而发出规则3.7的公布,因为刊发该等公布对相关上市公司的市价会造成影响。

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